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PILOTS AND PUBLIC POLICY: STEERING THROUGH THE
ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS
VICTOR MATHESON*

I.

& BRAD R.

HUMPHREYS**

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2009, a replacement for venerable Yankee Stadium will open in the Bronx at a cost of more than $1.3 billion,
making it the most expensive stadium construction project to date
in the United States.' The financing of this stadium project differs
significantly from most other new sports facility construction
projects and represents a significant change in public policy on the
financing of professional sports facilities. 2 Early indications suggest
that the financing method used to build the new Yankee Stadium,
could serve as a model for many other sports facility construction
3
projects across the country.
In 2006, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued two Private Letter Rulings that enabled the new Yankee Stadium construction project to be financed by a tax-exempt bond backed by
payments in lieu of taxes ("PILOT").4 These rulings effectively allowed the Yankees access to low interest tax-exempt bonds, as opposed to privately issued taxable bonds with higher interest rates, to
5
finance the construction of their privately owned sports facility.
The IRS Private Letter Rulings were significant because they appear
to circumvent certain provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that
* Professor of Economics, College of the Holy Cross.
** Professor of Economics, University of Alberta.

1. See Comm. on Corp., Auth. & Comm'n of the Assembly State of N.Y., The
House that You Built: An Interim Report into the Decision by New York City to
Subsidize the New Yankee Stadium, at 21-22 (2008), available at http://assembly.
state.ny.us/member files/092/20081105/report.pdf [hereinafter Interim Report]
(quoting construction price of new Yankee Stadium and comparing seat prices in
new Yankee Stadium to other U.S. stadiums).
2. See id. (commenting on use of payments in lieu of taxes, PILOTs).
3. See id. (noting use of tax-exempt city bonds to finance Yankee Stadium
construction).
4. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200640001 (July 11, 2006) [hereinafter Private Letter 1] (analyzing PILOT plan in relation to building of Yankee Stadium and allowing it); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200641002 (July 19, 2006) [hereinafter Private
Letter 2] (analyzing further provisions and implications of PILOT plan).
5. See Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (examining benefits of low interest tax-

exempt bonds over higher interest privately financed loans).
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were intended to curb the use of tax-exempt 6bond financing for the
construction of professional sports facilities.
Following the IRS rulings, New York City issued tax-exempt

public bonds to pay for the construction of the new Yankee Stadium. Due to the fact that the interest paid to these bondholders is
exempt from federal income taxes, the bonds carry a lower interest7
rate than private bonds that are subject to federal income taxes.
Over the thirty years between the bonds' issuance and maturity, this
interest rate differential results in hundreds of millions of dollars
saved in interest payments." The bonds' principal and interest will
be paid by the Yankees' revenues generated from their new
stadium. 9
These rulings and the subsequent tax-exempt bond issuance,
opened the floodgates to an additional wave of PILOT backed taxexempt bonds for the construction of sports facilities, and this new
wave shows no signs of slowing. 10 The Yankee PILOT decision
raises a number of important economic policy issues. 11 In this Article, we will discuss these policy issues and examine the behavior of
the Yankees following the decision.
II.

MLB's

ANTITRUST EXEMPTION, FRANCHISE

MOVES

AND

PUBLIC SUBSIDIES

Major League Baseball ("MLB") has enjoyed an exemption
from antitrust law for nearly one hundred years since the 1922 ruling in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.12 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
upheld the Federal Baseball precedent while noting that the decision's underlying reasoning, that baseball is not interstate commerce, is unquestionably flawed, at least given the modern
6. See id. (circumventing restriction on use of tax-exempt government bonds
to finance sports facility construction); Private Letter 2, supra note 4 (circumventing restriction on use of tax-exempt government bonds to finance sports facility construction); see also Interim Report, supra note 1, at 25 (comparing payments
under PILOT plan to "regular" property taxes).
7. See Interim Report, supranote 1, at 25 (describing how PILOT plan works).
8. See id. at 4 (reporting that annual interest savings to Yankees amounts to
approximately $7.7 million to $15.7 million for thirty years, totaling between $235
and $471 million).
9. See id. at 2-3 (explaining how Yankees are funding their new stadium).
10. See Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (describing how Yankees organization
will repay bonds using revenues generated from new Yankee Stadium).
11. See Interim Report, supra note 1, at 27-28 (arguing that new stadium will
not create permanent significant employment or economic activity).
12. See generally Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 207-09 (1922) (providing case analysis and holding).
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development of national media contracts.13 The courts, however,
have not seen fit to extend the exemption to other sports such as
boxing, football or basketball, even though granting only baseball
14
this status is somewhat inexplicable.
Among other consequences, baseball's antitrust exemption results in fewer MLB franchises than would exist absent the exemption. 15 The restriction in the number of MLB franchises means
that markets capable of supporting a MLB franchise do not have
one. 16 With the existence of these "open" markets, existing MLB
franchises are given important leverage when negotiating with state
and local governments over subsidies for the construction of new
baseball stadiums. 17 In addition, this antitrust exemption also provides the MLB with significant power to prevent any existing
franchises from moving into New York City to fill any void left by
the Mets' or Yankees' departure. 18 While the National Football
League ("NFL"), like MLB, also possesses significant monopoly
power, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, demonstrated that absent an

antitrust exemption, the NFL was unable to prohibit the Raiders'
owner, Al Davis, from moving his football team to Los Angeles despite the NFL's wishes for him to stay in Oakland.' 9 Similarly, any
13. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) ("Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws."); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 273 (1972) (holding that decision
of FederalBaseball, to be changed, must be done through legislation).
14. See United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 241 (1955) (holding
that promotion of boxing contests can be regulated under Sherman Act, which
regulates interstate commerce); see also Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S.
445, 448 (1957) (concluding that professional football can be regulated under antitrust laws); Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) ("Basketball . . . does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws.").
15. See Rodney Fort, Inelastic Sports Pricing,25 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
87, 87-94 (2004).
16. See Philip K. Porter & Christopher R. Thomas, Public Subsidies and the Location and Pricingof Sports, S. EcoN. J 1, 24 (2006).
17. See id. at 23-24 (noting that demand is higher than MLB team supply and
that creates leverage for MLB franchises).
18. See id. (commenting that unlike other sports, MLB has anti-trust exemption so supply of MLB teams is controlled and intentionally kept low).
19. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-88
(1984) (explaining reasoning of District Court, with which Supreme Court agreed,
in concluding that restricting team location violates antitrust rules). The District
Court cited three reasons for rejecting the NFL's argument. Id. at 1387. First, to
say that this particular act did not violate antitrust rules would be to say that the
NFL had other antitrust exemptions, and courts in the past have ruled that the
NFL has in fact violated antitrust several times. Id. at 1388. Second, the court has
found other sports organizations to be guilty of violating antitrust though their
product was "just as unitary ... and requires the same kind of cooperation from
the organization's members." Id. Finally, the district court rejected the NFL's at-
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threat by the Yankees to leave the New York City metropolitan area
would be an empty one absent the antitrust exemption, as any number of small market owners would jump at the chance to play in a

major market like New York City, even in an unrefurbished Yankee
Stadium. Due to the antitrust exemption, however, the Yankees, in
collusion with the MLB, could prevent such moves from
20
occurring.
Threats made by both the New York Yankees and the New York
Mets to leave the city of New York influenced the public financing
of both the Yankees' new stadium and the Mets' new stadium,

which are scheduled to open in New York City for the 2009 season. 2 1 In a memorandum from Andrew M. Alper, then director of
the New York City Industrial Development Agency ("NYCIDA"), to
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg explaining why the

Yankees were granted an exemption from the NYCIDA policy, Alper stated that failure to give the Yankees what they wanted would
"result in the New York Yankees relocating the Team to a stadium
outside the City." 2 2 Similarly, in a memorandum from Alper to
Mayor Bloomberg explaining why the Mets were granted a similar
exemption from the NYCIDA policy, Alper stated that failure to
give the Mets what they wanted would "result in the New York Mets
'23
relocating the Team to a stadium outside the City of New York."
Based on these two memoranda from the NYCIDA, it appears
that both of the MLB teams in New York City used the threat of
leaving to extract concessions from the City of New York. 24 Again,
economic theory provides a clear explanation for why professional
baseball teams have this power: they have significant market power
and operate as unregulated monopolies.2 5 Unlike most other ingument that the NFL's "clubs are not separate business entities whose products
have an independent value." Id.
20. See Porter & Thomas, supra note 16, at 23-24 (determining that anti-trust
exemption gives MLB significant power over MLB franchises due to limited number of teams).
21. See Memorandum from the N.Y.C. Indus. Dev. Agency to Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, Deviation from Uniform Tax Exemption Policy for Yankees Ballpark
Company 4 [hereinafter Yankees Memo]. The letter is undated but was likely sent
prior to the Inducement Resolution of March, 17, 2007.
22. Id.
23. Memorandum from the N.Y.C. Indus. Dev. Agency to Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, Deviation from Uniform Tax Exemption Policy for Queens Ballpark
[hereinafter Mets Memo].
24. See Interim Report, supra note 1, at 9 (commenting on Yankees threat to

leave New York City as major reason for subsidizing new Yankee Stadium).
25. See Porter & Thomas, supra note 16, at 24 (noting that because of limited
number of teams and greater demand for MLB teams cities are subsidizing baseball stadiums).
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dustries in the United States, the MLB receives special treatment
under federal antitrust law. 26 Economic theory predicts that mo-

nopolies restrict output in order to realize monopoly rents. 2 7 In
the case of the MLB, monopoly power is exercised by limiting the
total number of teams in each league. 28 In this specific case, it
means that the Yankees and the Mets were able to force state and
local governments to grant them special benefits not available in
other fields because of the antitrust exemption granted by the Federal Baseballdecision. 29 If the MLB did not have this special protection, the Yankees and Mets would not have had another viable
alternative market to threaten to move into. The new stadium construction projects would have been financed through other, traditional means, such as private bonds with a higher interest rate, not
public tax-exempt bonds being paid out of general revenues.30 The
IRS rulings effectively turn state and local government into investment bankers for professional sports teams in New York City and
give these privately held corporations access to tax-exempt bond
funding that was explicitly prohibited by the Tax Reform Act of
1986.31
The justification for the deviation granted to both the Yankees'
and Mets' stadiums was a threat to move out of New York City to
32
another market that would support a professional baseball team.
Again, the ultimate cause of the New York PILOT mess is the MLB's
antitrust exemption, a public policy decision made by the federal
33
courts that Congress has refused to overturn for nearly a century.
26. See Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 207 (1922) (finding that MLB is not subject to federal antitrust laws); Toolson
v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (reaffirming Supreme Court's decision in
FederalBaseball Club that MLB is not subject to federal antitrust laws).
27. Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, Do Economists Reach a Conclusion?:
Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidiesfor Sports Franchises,Stadiums and MegaEvents?, 5 EcoN. J. WATCH 294, 294-315 (2008).
28. See Porter & Thomas, supra note 16, at 23-24 (noting that supply of MLB
teams does not meet demand by cities for MLB teams).
29. See Yankees Memo, supra note 21; Mets Memo, supra note 23.
30. See generally Private Letter 2, supra note 4 (discussing PILOT program and

how it works in comparison to other tax programs or provisions).
31. See generally Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (illustrating provisions of PILOT
program that exempts it from 1986 Tax Reform Act).
32. See Yankees Memo, supra note 21; Mets Memo, supra note 23.

33. See Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 200 (1922) (holding that MLB qualifies for antitrust exemption); see also Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1953) (holding that MLB qualifies for
antitrust exemption); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 295-96 (1972) (holding that

MLB qualifies for antitrust exemption).
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III.

How PILOTs DIFFER FROM OTHER STADIUM FINANCING

The PILOT decision has resulted in a financing deal for construction of the new Yankee Stadium that differs in important ways
from how other new professional sports facilities have been financed in the post-1986 Tax Reform Act era. 34 Two examples
make these differences clear. 35 Nationals Park opened in Washington, D.C. on May 4, 2006.36 The stadium cost $610 million and was
financed through the sale of tax-exempt bonds issued by the City of
Washington, D.C.3 7 Because tax-exempt bonds were used to finance this stadium, the city's government had to raise taxes in order to pay the principal and interest on these bonds. 38 These
payments must come out of general tax revenues to comply with
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 39 This requirement places an important limit on the amount of tax-exempt bonds available for financing and constructing professional sports facilities. 40 Additionally,
paying the principal and interest on these bonds out of general tax
revenues has budgetary effects. 4 1 Because general tax revenues are
collected from a broader group of local residents than the sports
fans that enjoy the benefits of a new stadium, this requirement
reduces the amount of money spent on new sports facilities financed using tax-exempt bonds and may reduce construction costs
as well.

42

Another example is the building of AT&T Park, home of the
San Francisco Giants, which opened on March 31, 2000. 43 The stadium cost $357 million to build ($426 million in 2007 dollars) and
was privately financed. 44 No tax-exempt bonds were issued to pay
for the facility construction by any state or local government. 45 The
team had to pay a higher interest rate on the borrowed money than
34. See Interim Report, supra note 1, at 2-3 (requesting increased public financing for construction of new Yankee Stadium in New York City).
35. See id. at 22 (showing two examples that illustrate differences from 1986
Tax Reform Act era).
36. See id. (referencing Nationals Park example).
37. See id. (discussing financing of Nationals Park).
38. See id. (outlining city's role in raising capital).
39. See id. (explaining provisions of 1986 Tax Act that must be met).
40. See id. (presenting limitations on use of tax-exempt bonds).
41. See id. (commenting on budgetary effect of providing private sport teams
with public financing).
42. See id. (referencing limitations placed on using public funds to build
stadiums).
43. See id. (discussing construction history of AT&T Park).
44. See id. (presenting stadium's total cost).
45. See id. (detailing how state financed ballpark's construction).
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they would have if they had access to tax-exempt financing, making
the construction project more costly to the team. 46
Clearly, the PILOT decision has had a profound effect on the
Yankee Stadium construction project. The access to lower interest
rates offered by tax-exempt funding, coupled with the lack of
budget-related limits on costs has combined to produce the most
expensive stadium construction project in the history of Major
League Baseball, and indeed all of professional sports in North
47
America.
IV.

TICKET PRICES AND NEW FACILITIES

IN MLB

Major League Baseball teams produce a product that can be
replicated by only a few imperfect substitutes in the local economy. 48 Unlike other firms, MLB teams face little competition in the

marketplace. 49 This market power gives MLB teams significant latitude when setting prices. 50 In most cases, firms facing competition
set their prices at a level "that the market will bear," meaning that
these businesses face significant price competition from other
firms, which in turn limits their ability to raise prices. 5 1 A business
with many competitors cannot raise prices too much because its
customers will turn elsewhere. 52 MLB teams do not face this type of
competition. 53 Because their product has so few close substitutes,
teams can set prices based on what they consider best for their organization, such as basing prices upon market demand for the tickets. 5 4 In large markets, like New York City, this market demand can

be quite large compared to the number of tickets sold in any season.55 The only constraint on price increases faced by professional
sports teams is the willingness of fans to pay these increased prices
56
in sufficient numbers.

Porter and Thomas recently analyzed the political economy of
ticket pricing in new publicly subsidized sports facilities. The
46. See id. (outlining impact of failure to use tax-free public funds).
47. See id. (describing availability of capital enabled by PILOT).
48. See Coates & Humphreys, supra note 27, at 294-95 (commenting on MLB's
monopoly of baseball in America).
49. See Porter & Thomas, supra note 16, at 24 (focusing on lack of viable alternative baseball leagues).
50. See id. (describing lack of free market principals).
51. See id. (noting proper function of competition within markets).
52. See id. (discussing how free markets are pro-consumer).
53. See id. (commenting on lack of free market principals in MLB).
54. See id. (explaining how MLB can set higher prices).
55. See id. (detailing problems of supply and demand in MLB).
56. See id. (discussing broad spectrum of fans willing to pay).
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model developed in the Porter and Thomas paper predicts that
teams seeking public subsidies for new facility construction projects
price their tickets below the profit maximizing level prior to the
awarding of the subsidy and then raise ticket prices significantly after moving into the new facility. 57 This model provides important

insight into the price setting behavior of the Yankees as they move
into the new stadium.
Professional baseball teams offer tickets for sale at a wide variety of prices. Although the cost of attending a MLB game is often
expressed in terms of an "average" or "median" ticket price, this
simplification abstracts from actual choices facing consumers, who
can have as many as fifteen different ticket prices to choose from
58
when buying a ticket to a baseball game.
The New York Yankees' increase in ticket prices at their new
stadium has drawn a great deal of media attention. 59 In the 2008
season, the Yankees offered season tickets at fifteen different prices,
ranging from $12 per game for a full season ticket in the bleachers
to $325 per game for a full season ticket in the "Field Championship" section. 60 The average season ticket price at Yankee Stadium
was $106, and the median price was $70.61 The price of Yankees'
2009 season tickets in the new stadium will range from the same
$12 per game for a full season ticket in the bleachers, but now will
top off at $2,500 per game for a full season ticket in the "Legends"
section. 62 The price differences represent a 139% annual change
in the average price of a Yankees' ticket and a 669% annual increase in the price of the highest ticket price offered.
The average increase in the median price of a Yankees' ticket
from 2008 to 2009 was seven percent, with the per game price of a
season ticket for the bleachers remaining unchanged at twelve dollars per game in the new stadium. 63 Although the team has heralded this as evidence that the "average fan" would not be priced
57. See id. (discussing price schemes employed by baseball owners).

58. See Major League Baseball, AMERICAN LEAGUE RED BOOK (1975-2006)
[hereinafter RD BOOK]; Major League Baseball, NATIONAL LEAGUE GREEN BOOK
(1975-2006) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK].
59. See id. (discussing media attention on ticket prices).
60. See id. (detailing full season ticket prices).
61. See id. (calculating average ticket prices).
62. N.Y. Yankees, Relocation Program Guide for the New Yankee Stadium
(2008), available at http://newyork.yankees.mlb.com/nyy/ballpark/
newstadiumrelocation-guide.jsp (last visited May 14, 2009) [hereinafter Relocation Guide].
63. See id. (analyzing prices increases when Yankees switch from old Yankee
Stadium to New Yankee Stadium).
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out of the new stadium, at this time only full season ticket prices,
and not the price of game day bleacher tickets, have been announced. 64 While the per game price paid by fans who purchase
eighty-one bleacher tickets in advance has not changed, the price of
a game day bleacher ticket (a better indicator of how much the
"average fan" will have to pay) remains uncertain.
Most research on ticket pricing in professional sports focuses
on simple average ticket prices based on the price of all tickets offered by a team. Rodney Fort recently surveyed the literature on
ticket pricing in professional sports. 65 Much of this literature uses
average prices across all ticket categories to analyze team-pricing
decisions. 66 As the above example of recent changes in the
Yankees' ticket prices demonstrates, however, teams offer tickets for
sale at a number of different prices and do not typically change
ticket prices uniformly across all ticket prices offered. 67 An analysis
of changes in the average ticket price may not reflect changes in
ticket prices like those made by the Yankees in advance of their
move into their new stadium.
We collected data on the individual prices charged by every
MLB team for all tickets offered over the period 1975-2006, with the
exception of the 2002 MLB season. 6 8 The sources of this MLB
ticket price data are the American League Red Book and National
League Green Book, which are published annually by MLB. 69 The
Red Book and Green Book contain detailed ticket price data, including
a list of the price of every ticket offered for sale to walk up ticket
buyers in each season.7 0 The Red Book and Green Book do not contain information about the price of season tickets or how many
7y
seats were available at each price.
On average, MLB teams offered tickets at about six different
price levels in any season, with one team, the Arizona
Diamondbacks, offering the highest amount with fifteen different
64. See id. (outlining only season ticket prices, not individual game ticket
prices).
65. See Fort, supra note 15, at 87 (examining inelasticity of sport ticket

pricing).
66. See id. (commenting on methodology utilized).

67. See Comm. on Corp., Auth. & Comm'n of the Assembly State of N.Y., The
Request for Increased Public Financing for Construction of a New Yankee Stadium
in New York City (2008) [hereinafter Request for Increased Public Financing].; see
also Relocation Guide, supra note 62.
68. RED BooK, supra note 58; GREEN BooK, supra note 58.
69. RED BooK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
70. RED BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
71. RED BooK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
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ticket-pricing levels. 72 In part, these differences in ticket prices reflect differences in the viewing experience for fans: a fan sitting in
the first row behind home plate experiences the game in a different
way than a fan sitting in the last row of the upper deck. 73 Fans are
willing to pay more for the experience of sitting in the first row
behind home plate than they are for the experience of sitting in the
last row of the upper deck. The large number of different prices
offered by MLB teams suggests that they have many options available to them when changing prices.74 It also suggests that changes
in the average or median price of a ticket may not reflect changes
in ticket prices across the board.
Over the period of 1975-2006, the average annual increase in
the average ticket price charged by MLB teams playing in the same
stadium as the previous season was 7.71%. 75 The average annual
76
increase in the median ticket price of 7.51% was a similar change.
Because MLB teams offer tickets at many different prices, the
change in the average or median ticket price may not reflect the
overall pattern of ticket price changes from year to year. 77 An alternative way of looking at price changes is to examine how the highest priced and lowest priced tickets change. The average annual
increase in the highest priced ticket offered by MLB teams playing
in the same stadium over the period of 1975-2006 was 9.21%.78 The
average annual increase in the lowest priced ticket offered by MLB
teams over this period was 9.68%. 79 Teams playing in existing stadiums tended to raise the price of tickets at the upper and lower end
of the price range more than tickets in the middle of the price
range.

80

In stark contrast to MLB teams that continue to play in the
same stadiums year after year, MLB teams playing in new stadiums
72. RED BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
73. RED BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
74. Fort, supra note 15, at 91-92 (concluding that more goes into ticket pricing than attempts to maximize profit and accordingly varying ticket pricing levels);
Porter & Thomas, supra note 16, at 11-22 (postulating that team owners base their
ticket prices upon many things including bidding wars for public subsidies).
75. RED BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.

76. RED BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
77. Porter & Thomas, supra note 16, at 15-16 (calculating ticket prices).
78. RED BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
79. RED BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
80. See RED BOOK, supra note 58 (noting that prices ranged significantly more
at upper and lower ends of pricing spectrum than for middle range priced seats);
GREEN BOOK, supra note 58 (noting that prices ranged significantly more at upper
and lower ends of pricing spectrum than for middle range priced seats).
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have, on average, increased their prices at a higher annual rate. 8 1
The average annual increase in the average ticket price charged by
an MLB team playing in a new stadium over the period of 19752006 was 21.01%; the average increase in the median ticket price
was 14.95%. There were seventeen new baseball stadiums opened
during the period of 1975-2006. In part, these ticket price increases
reflect a different experience for fans in a new stadium, but they
also depend on the market power of MLB teams. The increases at
the top and bottom of the price range charged by MLB teams in
new stadiums differed even more than the changes in the average
or median prices. The average annual increase in the highest ticket
price offered by MLB teams playing in a new stadium was 34.56%.82
The average increase in the lowest priced ticket offered was
7.21%.83 Ultimately, it is the high-end tickets that tend to see the

biggest price increases when a team moves into a new MLB
stadium.
No MLB team moving into a new stadium in the past thirtythree years has increased the price of the most expensive ticket offered for sale as much as the Yankees have in 2009.84 The 669%

increase in the price of the highest tickets offered by the Yankees is
twenty times larger than the average annual increase in the highest
ticket price offered by MLB teams moving into new stadiums, and
more than three times larger than the next largest annual increase
85
in the highest ticket price offered.
The annual increase in the average price of a ticket offered in
2000 by the San Francisco Giants, the last team to move into a new
privately financed stadium, was 21.3%.86 On the other hand, access
to relatively low cost tax-exempt bonds under the PILOT ruling allowed the Yankees to build the most expensive baseball stadium in
the history of baseball. 87 Because of the lavish nature of the new
stadium, the Yankees are able to pass on extraordinary ticket price
increases to their fans. In addition, part of these extraordinary
ticket price increases may be attributed to strategic behavior on the
81. RED
82. RED
83. RED
84. RED

BOOK, supra note

58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
85. RED BOOK, supra note 58; GREEN BOOK, supra note 58.
86. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 58 (calculating that annual increase in highest priced ticket offered by Giants was 9.52% and increase in lowest price ticket
offered was 66.6%).
87. See Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (allowing tax-exempt bonds to be used to
help finance stadium); Private Letter 2, supra note 4 (allowing tax-exempt bonds to
be used as well).
BOOK, supra note
BOOK, supra note
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part of the Yankees, as predicted by the public choice model of
ticket pricing and subsidies developed by economists Philip K.
88
Porter and Christopher R. Thomas.
V.

THE FALlACY or NEW JOB CREATION IN SPORTS
FACILITY CONSTRUCTION

One clear theme emerges from the PILOT financing of the
new Yankee Stadium: the belief that the new Yankee Stadium would
be an engine of economic growth in the local economy. This alleged economic benefit was sufficient justification for granting this
exceptional privilege to the Yankees. 8 9 The importance ofjob creation associated with both the construction and ongoing operation
of the new stadium were mentioned repeatedly as the primary justification in both the public and private debates of this controversial
project. °°
The claim of significant economic benefits resulting from a
sports stadium's construction and operation is problematic. First,
the reports of these so-called "economic benefits" are based on are
forecasts, not actual counts ofjobs created or income earned in and
around the new stadium. In the PILOT issue and every other sports
facility construction project studied, these forecasts of economic
benefits are treated as factual assessments, rather than forecasts.
Statistically, forecasts, in and of themselves, are not useful data unless they measure the statistical uncertainty associated with the data
measured. The claimed future economic benefits from the new
Yankee Stadium were never placed in this context. 9 1 This severely
limits their use for informing economic policy decisions. This
88. See Porter & Thomas, supra note 16, at 3-11 (explaining public choice
model).
89. See Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (finding in Yankee's favor that that bonds
do not meet either private security or payment test or private loan financing test
and are therefore outside definition of private activity bonds); Private Letter 2,
supra note 4 (finding in Yankee's favor utilizing similar test, and applying similar
reasoning to other areas including "parking lots" for non-private activity bond classification); see also N.Y.C. Indus. Dev. Agency, Yankees Ballpark Company, NYCIDA
Project Cost/Benefit Analysis (2006), available at http://www.goodjobsny.org/
Yankeesida.pdf [hereinafter Yankees NYCIDA Analysis] (citing economic growth
and job creation as reason for public financing of new Yankee Stadium).
90. See Yankees NYCIDA Analysis, supra note 89 (analyzing alleged rationale
for public PILOT financing); see also Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (noting benefits
of PILOT programs under Treas. Reg. §1.141-4(e) for non-private activity bond
classification).
91. See Interim Report, supra note 1, at 27 (showing no evidence of economic
benefit from stadium construction); see also Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (neglecting to include measure of uncertainty as to economic benefits); Private Letter 2,
supra note 4 (neglecting measure of uncertainty as to economic benefits).
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problem has already surfaced in the Yankee Stadium PILOT decision, as the claim of thousands of full time jobs made at the time
92
the exemption was granted has proven to be wildly overstated.
Second, there is no evidence in the large body of peer reviewed scholarly research on the economic impact of professional
sports facilities that indicates that any professional sports facility
construction project or the ongoing operation of any such facility
93
has generated tangible economic benefits in the local economy.

In fact, economists widely agree on this point, and it is supported by
decades of evidence and data. 9 4 Even if the new Yankee Stadium is
the most expensive stadium construction project in history, it is unlikely to generate any significant economic benefit for New York
City.
Among the most abused and commonly cited justifications
from subsidy-seekers is the claim of tangible economic benefit of
construction jobs created during stadium construction projects.
This justification is commonly used due to its apparent self-evidence. One has to simply drive by a construction site and observe
workers busy at work to confirm these claims of economic benefits
in the community. This view, however, is overly simplistic and does
not identify the true value of these projects. Determining the actual net economic benefit generated by sports stadium construction

projects requires calculating the number ofjobs that are created or
improved that would not have otherwise been in the absence of the
project. Moreover, it requires considering how many of the workers
filling those jobs would have been unemployed if the project had
not taken place. 9 5 According to economic theory, only this small
subset of the total number of jobs created by a stadium construction project can be counted as part of the economic impact of the
92. See Interim Report, supranote 1, at 27-28 (concluding that there has been
no evidence shown to support theory that building new Yankee stadium will create
new, not already available, jobs).
93. See generally Coates & Humphreys, supra note 27, at 296 (finding no economic benefits to local economies due to operation or construction of sporting
venues).
94. See id. at 302-09 (surveying prior research as to economic benefits of stadium building and operation).
95. See Dennis Zimmerman, Subsidizing Stadiums: Who Benefits, Who Pays?, in
SPORTS, JOBS

& TAXES:

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 119,

121-33 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds. 1997) (discussing difficulties in
assessing benefits of stadiums in respect to stadium financing through public subsidies, noting that jobs created are one of the potential benefits of stadium construction); see also Coates & Humphreys, supra note 27, at 297-300 (discussing how
proponents of stadium subsidies focus on tangible benefits, such as jobs and tax
revenue enhancement).
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project. 9 6 Calculating this number cannot be accomplished by a
simple inspection of the construction site, and assuming that every
worker observed on the job site represents new economic benefit to
97
the local economy is erroneous.
The net economic benefit created by stadium construction
projects is much smaller than the total economic benefit (which
can be easily found by simply adding up the total amount of spending associated with the project) because of the presence of opportunity costs and the double counting that typically takes place when
non-economists attempt to estimate these benefits.98 Opportunity
cost is the cost of foregone alternatives.9 9 In the case of the new
Yankee Stadium, the facility generates significant opportunity costs
for the City of New York and the local community. 10 0 NYCIDA President Seth Pinsky, before the New York State Assembly on July 2,
2008, stated that his agency receives hundreds of requests each year
for public tax-exempt funding for construction projects. 10 1 Logistically, the materials and supplies currently allocated to construction
of the new stadium could have been used on other construction
projects.' 0 2 Additionally, the construction workers employed on
this project could have worked on other projects. Economic theory
tells us that only those construction workers who would not have
had a job if the stadium were not built can be counted as net economic benefit from the project.1 03 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment rate for construction workers in
96. See Coates & Humphreys, supra note 27, at 300-02 (explaining that calculating benefit of job creation due to stadium construction is not simple endeavor,
and that various academics and economists have criticized methods used in promotion materials released by stadium proponents).
97. See id. at 304 ("In general, the results of this study do not support a positive correlation between professional sports and job creation.").
98. See id. at 302-06 (discussing opportunity costs associated with stadium construction projects and empirical evidence from economists supporting lack of affect on local economies by large construction projects).
99. See id. at 308-11 (providing as example of opportunity costs, tax collections used to pay stadium debt that could have gone to other public projects with
higher rates of social return on project).
100. See Request for Increased Public Financing, supra note 67 (noting that
New York City could have issued billion plus dollars of tax-exempt bonds to finance any number of alternatives).
101. See id. at 28-29 (commenting that NYCIDA has helped fund over threehundred projects and many more have applied for public tax-exempt funding).
102. See Yankees Memo, supra note 21 (discussing possible opportunity costs
associated with stadium construction).
103. See Zimmerman, supra note 95, at 122-23 (discussing analysis of estimates
of economic benefits associated with construction of NFL's Baltimore Raven's stadium, including jobs created or lost, and concluding that stadium was poor investment in terms of income or jobs generated).
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August of 2008 was

1.9%.104 This low unemployment rate means
that the actual number of new construction jobs created by the new
Yankee Stadium project was a tiny fraction of the total number of
10 5
jobs created by the project.
The prospects for long-term economic benefits resulting from
the operation of the stadium are equally dim. While it is undoubtedly true that the new Yankee stadium will attract in excess of four
million fans per year, the old Yankee Stadium, which stands just
one block south of the new facility, has similarly drawn over four
million fans per year for each of the past four years. Contrarily, the
new stadium promises to draw fewer fans because its capacity is
nearly 6,000 seats less than the old Yankee Stadium. 10 6 Furthermore, due to the fact that the new Yankee Stadium offers significantly improved eating and drinking options inside the stadium,
economic activity is being drawn away from the local, surrounding
10 7
neighborhoods and into the stadium itself.

VI.

UNTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE

PILOT

DECISION

Despite the unseemly events surrounding the financing plan
for the new Yankee Stadium, the financing of this new baseball stadium is economically desirable to certain individuals. 10 8 Economist
Dennis Zimmerman pointed out that tax-exempt financing of professional sports facilities is dependent on the application of the
benefit principle of taxation to the financing deal and the goal of
professional sports facility public policy. 10 9 If the policy goal is to
eliminate public subsidies from the professional sports facility con104. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-11 Unemployed Persons by Industry and Class of Worker, Not Seasonally Adjusted (Feb. 6,
2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.tl .htm (detailing unemployment rate for construction workers at 15.3% as of December 2008).
105. See id. (providing unemployment rates for numerous sectors).
106. See N.Y. Yankees, New Yankee Stadium Comparison, available at http://
newyork.yankees.mlb.com/nyy/ballpark/new.stadium-comparison.jsp (comparing statistics between old and new stadiums, including seating for old stadium at
56,886 and new stadium at 52,325).
107. See id. (noting nearly three times dining and lounge accommodations in
new stadium compared to old stadium)
108. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 95, at 121-22 (providing economic
analysis of public subsidies of stadium financing).
109. See id. at 119-20 (discussing cost benefit analysis as applied to stadium
financing through subsidies and taxation and noting each taxpayer's contribution
to publicly provided services should be function of benefits received from that
service). Zimmerman further notes that this principle helps discourage over- or
under-provision of public services, especially applicable to professional sports financing where most of the benefits accruing are consumed privately rather than
collectively. See id.
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struction, then the Yankee PILOT rulings are disastrous. 1 0 This
precedent opens up new avenues for the subsidization of professional sports and effectively overturns the prohibitions against the
use of tax-exempt bonds to finance new sports facility construction
projects in the 1986 Tax Reform Act without the consent of Congress. This is likely to lead to even larger subsidies for the construction of professional sports facilities.' I Additionally, there is little
reason to believe that such subsidization will stop with professional
sports franchises. Given the weak theoretical and empirical foundations upon which the Yankees' claim of promoting economic development rests, nearly any enterprise could claim that their own
capital expenditures promote economic development with similar
credibility.
Conversely, if the public policy goal on subsidies for the construction of professional sports facilities is to conform to the benefit
principle of taxation (also known as the "user-pays principle"), the
Yankee PILOT decision is an improvement. Prior to the Yankee
PILOT decision, funds to pay off tax-exempt bonds issued to finance professional sports facility construction projects typically
came from general tax revenues, specific broad based revenue generation programs like lotteries, rental car taxes, hotel taxes or other
sources of funds like Tax Increment Financing districts. 112 Using
government revenues from broad based sources like sales, property
or income taxes violates the benefit principle of taxation because
the group that benefits from the subsidies, team owners, professional athletes and fans, is only a small segment of the local economy while the group that pays for the subsidies, taxpayers, is a
much larger group, which may not see the benefit of their tax
subsidies. 113
Under the Yankee PILOT ruling, the tax-exempt bonds issued
to finance construction of the new stadium will be paid using revenues generated by the team in the new facility." 14 Revenues paid by
fans of the team who attend games and from the team itself (to the
110. See Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (discussing proposition of tax-exempt
bonds for construction of new Yankee Stadium).
111. See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2000).
112. See Private Letter 1, supra note 4 (noting financing differences between
different options available generally); see also Interim Report, supra note 1, at 2-5
(detailing plan and other considerations behind decision for financing new Yankee Stadium).
113. See Interim Report, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing implications and state
legislative/executive plans and position behind use of PILOT program).
114. See id. at 12-14 (discussing IRS concerns regarding financing program
and resolution).
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extent that the incidence of this effective tax also falls on the team
are the primary source of these revenues) will pay off the tax-exempt bonds. Therefore, under the Yankee PILOT ruling, the beneficiaries of the subsidy bear the cost.
It is important to note that this is a second best outcome, because the federal government is still forgoing the tax revenues that
would have been collected if the new Yankee Stadium had been
financed using private, taxable bonds. 1 5 In this sense, all federal
taxpayers are subsidizing the Yankees and their fans by an amount
equal to the foregone federal tax revenues. 116 This subsidy would
still exist, however, if the tax-exempt bonds were paid off using general tax revenues.
Ultimately, policy-makers will soon be forced to address the
public funding of private construction projects: whether it is desirable to significantly expand the number of projects eligible for tax
subsidies in exchange for a more direct connection between those
11 7
receiving benefits from the projects and those paying the taxes.
Conversely, whether the state and municipal bond tax exemption
should only narrowly extend to true public works, even if this
means taxing the populace more broadly when certain segments of
the population are more apt to benefit from certain projects. The
IRS's decision in the case of Yankee Stadium appears to contradict,
at the very least, the spirit of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Given
this contradiction, the issue should elicit renewed legislative and
judicial attention.
115. See id. at 24-25 (discussing additional funding concerns and representations by several parties, including unanswered questions).
116. See id. at 15-19 (reviewing assessment of land beneath new Yankee Stadium and assessed value).
117. See id. at 12-22 (reviewing IRS issues and questions that have arisen regarding value of land and proposed methods of funding that could have been
considered).
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